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COMMENT

SANCTIONS IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POWER
Stephen B. Burbank*
The most recent proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure1 present interesting questions from the perspective of
Copyright
•

1983 by Stephen B. Burbank

.o

Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968,

J.D. 1973, Harvard University. This is a revised version of remarks delivered to the Civil
Procedure Section at the 1983 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.

l.

A June 1981 preliminary draft of the proposed amendments was published for com
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
90 F.R.D. 451 ( 1981) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft]. Public hearings were held in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1981) and in Los Angeles (Nov. 6, 1981). See id. at 451,454. The

ment.

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted its final draft of the proposed amendments
(other than the proposed amendments to Rules 4 and 45, which were treated separately) to the

Advisory Com
mittee's Final Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Mar.
9, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Final Draft]. After

Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on March 9, 1982.

making changes, the Standing Committee recommended that the proposed amendments be

See letter from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F.
Hofstra Law Review); letter from Hon. Edward
T. Gignoux to Joseph F. Spaniol (July 14,1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review);
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 86 (Sept. 22-23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. The Conference approved the proposed amendments
with minor changes at its September 1982 meeting and transmitted them to the Supreme
Court. See id.
On April 28, 1983, the Court adopted the proposed amendments, effective August l,
1983, and authorized the Chief Justice to transmit them to Congress. 51 U.S.L. W. 450 l (U.S.
May 3 1983). See A MEND M EN TS TO THE RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 3-25 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SuPREME

approved by the Judicial Conference.

Spaniol (June 30, 1982) (copy on file with the

,

Cou RT R E P ORT] The proposed Rules as approved by the Judicial Conference, together with
.

the Advisory Committee's Notes and forms are printed in

id. at 35-84; see also 97 F.R.D. 165-

244 (1983).
For the fate of the proposed amendment to Rule 4, see Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (delaying effective date); Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
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the jur isprudence of court rulemaking. That is a perspective which,
e xcept as to matters of rulemaking process and structure, has been
largely neglected, 2and it has not informed the discussion of the most
controversial

of the

proposed

amendments, those

dealing

with

sanctions.
The 1980 amendments, we well remember, were criticized in
high places as a "compromise" and as "tinkering changes. "3 AI-

Stat. 2527 (enacting an amendment to Rule 4). See also Siegel, Practice Commentary on
Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Ejf Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Pre
cautions, 96 F.R.D. 88 (I 983).
2. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of l934, 130 U. PA. L.REV. 1015, 1018-23,
1193-97 (1982).For suggested changes in the court rulemaking process,see W. BROWN, FED
ERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 41-63, 118-34 (1981). for proposals as to
structural alternatives, see id. at 64-86, 108-17. In February, 1982, the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association approved principles to "promote openness in the rule-making
process" that included publishing rulemaking procedures, publishing and distributing draft
rules and major changes therein, holding public hearings on draft rules and major changes,
maintaining publicly available minutes of proceedings, and taking action on final reports on
proposed rules at open meetings. See SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELE
GATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 9-10 (1982). The House of Delegates also ap
.
proved changes in the relevant statutes and procedures so as to delegate rulemaking authority
to the Judicial Conference and to make the Conference's Advisory Committees "broadly repre
sentative of all segments of the legal profession ....
"!d. at 9. The long-ago promised formal
statement of rulemaking procedures from the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, see Burbank, supra, at 1021 n.l7, has yet to appear. The
chairman of that committee, Judge Gignoux,has, however,testified at a hearing on the federal
court rulemaking process held by the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad
ministration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee on April 21, 1983. Copies of Judge
Gignoux's statement and of the statements of James F. Holderman (on behalf of the ABA)
and Alan B.Morrison (Director,Public Citizen Litigation Group) are on file with the Hofstra
Law Review.
One matter of court rulemaking jurisprudence that,in light of the proposed amendments,
can no longer be neglected concerns the relationship between supervisory court rules and local
court rules. The proposed amendments explicitly permit local rulemaking on some matters, see
proposed fED. R.Ctv. P. 16(b), SuPREME CouRT REPORT, supra note I, at 5 (categories of
cases may be exempted from scheduling order requirement); id. at 5-6 (magistrate may be
authorized to enter (and modify) scheduling order), and the Advisory Committee Notes else
where state that local experimentation is permitted. See prop:Jsed fED. R. Ctv.P. 16 advisory
committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT, supra note I, at 52 (responsibility for drafting
pretrial order).The rulemakers' criteria in making these judgments are not clear; nor are the
implications of this greater specificity about local court rulemaking for other areas where it is
lacking. How, for instance, can a local rule limiting the number of interrogatories be upheld
under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) (I pretermit fED. R.Ctv.P. 83, which in my view is invalid,
see Burbank, supra, at 1193 n.763), given the Committee's 1980 decision to withdraw an
amendment to fED. R. Ctv. P. 33(a) that would have blessed such rules, a decision supported
by reference to "[t]he constantly-echoed criticism
that a limitation on the number of
questions was arbitrary,unreasonable and unnecessary"? H.R. Doc. No.306, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1980).
3. 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000 (1980) (dissenting statement of Powell, J.). We may not
remember that "tinkering" by state legislatures was one of the rallying cries in the campaign
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though compromise also appears to have played a part in the pro
posed amendments,4 their emphasis on sanctions represents no mere
tinkering. To be sure, sanctions for a willful violation of Rule 1 1 and
for various defaults in connection with discovery were part of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Moreover, at least since
Professor Rosenberg's influential 1958 article,6 sanctions have been
an important item on the agenda of those concerned about discovery
abuse.Sanctions received attention in the 1970 Amendments 7 and
again in the 1980 Amendments.8 But, with these proposed amend
ments, they have moved center-stage. The rulemakers propose: sanc
tions for violation of the certification requirement imposed by pro
posed Rule 1 1 for pleadings, motions and other papers,9 sanctions for

for federal legislation authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure in civil
actions at law, see Report of the Committee on Umform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B. A. J. 509,
513 ( 1 920) ("[c]onstant unscientific legislation"), as well as in the national campaign for pro
cedural reform, see_, e.g., Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD:
CENTENARY ESSAYS 55, 61-63 ( A. Reppy ed. 1949) ("Code Tinkering in New York"). More
over, Dean Clark, the Reporter of the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, adduced
the spectre of congressional "tinkering" in arguing against an interpretation of the Rules Ena
bling Act of 1 934 that would require the submission of amendments to Congress. See Bur
bank, supra note 2, at 1 1 53 n.60 I.
Now that the rulemaking process has been more closely assimilated to the legislative pro
cess and may become even more closely assimilated, see s upra notes I & 2, and in light of the
speed with which these proposed amendments follow the 1 980 amendments, is there reason to
fear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will become a latter day Throop Code? On the
Throop Code, see Clark, supra, at 62.
4. Thus, the preliminary draft of proposed FED. R. Civ. P. l 6(b) required "the judge"
to enter a scheduling order, Preliminary Draft, supra note I, at 466, and the Advisory Com
mittee Note made clear that the choice of language was deliberate, reflecting the Committee's
"judgment that it is preferable that this task should be handled by a district judge rather than
a magistrate, except when the magistrate is acting under 28 U .S.C. § 636." /d. at 472. In
response to objections by federal magistrates, the Advisory Committee changed the language
in its final draft to permit entry of a scheduling order by a magistrate "only when specifically
authorized by district court rule . . . . " See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of
United States Magistrates (Oct. 10, 1 981) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Final
Draft, supra note l, at 9. The Standing Committee added language to enable a magistrate to
modify a schedule "when specifically authorized by district court rule." See letter from Hon.
Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F. Spaniol, supra note I. The words "only" and "specifically"
in proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) were deleted by the Judicial Conference. See Proceedings,
supra note I, at 86; SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I, at 42. See also id. at 5-6.
5. See 308 U.S. 645, 676 ( 1 937) (Rule ll); id. at 704 (Rule 30(g)); id. at 7 1 0-13 (Rule
37) see also id. at 736 (Rule 56(g)).
6. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pre/rial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480
(1958).
7. See 398 U.S. 977 (!970).
8. See 446 U.S. 995 (!980).
9. Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. II provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
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failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, for failure to appear
at, to be prepared to participate in, or to participate in good faith in,
a conference, under proposed Rule 16/0 and sanctions for violation
of the certification requirement imposed by proposed Rule 26 for dis
covery requests, responses ·and objections.
11

read the pleading, motion, o r other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor·
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, in
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee.
SUPREME COURT REPORT,

1 0.

supra note 1, at 4-5.

Proposed FED. R. C!v. P. 16(f) provides:
(f) SANCTIONS. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or

pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or
pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in
good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with
regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall
require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's
fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
SUPREME COURT REPORT,

1 1.

supra note I, at 8.

Proposed FED. R. C!v. P. 26(g) provides:
(g) SIGNING OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJEC

TIONS. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address.
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the
request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (I) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. if a re.quest, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the party making the request, response or objection ar.d a
party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed.
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I will not rehearse-although I will touch on some of-the pru
dential arguments of those who favor and those who oppose en
hanced emphasis on sanctions as a means to meet and deter per
ceived abuses in the conduct of civil litigation. My concern, rather,
has to do with questions of power.The analysis is offered with no
pretensions to definitiveness. It may, however, stimulate further
thought about questions that, it seems to me , have received inade
quate attention in the past.
In the Note to proposed Rule 11, the Advisory Committee, after
observing that "in practice Rule 1 1 has not been effective in deter
ring abuses " and that the courts have been reluctant to impose sanc
tions, states:
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by build
ing upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court
to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose op
ponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See,
e.g., Roadway Express, Inc.v. Piper, 447 U.S.752 (1980); Hall
Cole, 412 U.S.

1,

5

v.

(1973).12

In the Note to proposed Rule 26, the Committee states:
Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on at
torneys who abuse the discovery rules, ...Rule 26(g) makes ex
plicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanc
tions and requires them to use it. This authority derives from Rule

37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power. See Road
way ... i'v!artin

v.

Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 661-62 (D.

Col. 1980); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who
Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U.

Chi.L. Rev. 619 (1977).13

In one Note, the Committee acknowledges that the proposed
amendment represents an expansion of existing authority. In the
other, it asserts that the proposed amendment merely codifies ex
isting authority and requires the courts to exercise it.The apparent

If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party
on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
SuPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I, at 10-ll.
12. Proposed FED. R. Ctv. P. II advisory committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT,
supra note l, at 38.
13. Proposed FED. R. Ctv. P. 26 advisory committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT,
supra note l , at 60.
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inconsistency suggests a need to examine the extent to which the
Committee's proposed sanction provisions are, in fact, restatements
of existing authority, and to the extent they are not, whether they

pose any serious questions of powe r.
I am uneasy whenever, as in the Advisory Committee Note to
proposed Rule 26, I encounter a defense of an assertion of power
predicated on multiple sources of authority. My uneasiness is condi
tioned generally in the context of supervisory court rulemaking by an
awareness, based on historical research, that the Advisory Commit
tee has not often been overly troubled by questions of power.1 4 In
deed, the Reporter of the 1938 Civil Rules, then Dean Clark, once
wrote an article, based on a memorandum he had prepared for the
Advisory Committee, in which he traced the authority to deal with
matters of procedure affecting appeals to a variety of sources.1 6He
later noted to a correspondent that Professor Moore had "always
laughed slyly at [that] article on the basis that there I did much
rewriting of the Act. I have answered that some one must do it and
that I was affording a logical basis therefor."
16
Proposed Rule 26 (g)requires every attorney or unrepresented
party to sign every discovery request, response or objection and pro
vides that the signature constitutes an elaborate certification calling
for, among other things, an exercise of judgment about such matters
as the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation.The proposed Rule also provides that if a certification
is made in violation of the Rule, the· court

shall impose an appropri

ate sanction that may include reasonable expenses incurred because
of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.17 To what ex
tent does this provision regarding sanctions "make explicit the au
thority judges now have " ?
In

Roadway Express, Inc.

v.

Piper/8 the Court considered three

14.

See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1132-3 7, 1194.

15.

For the art i cle see Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to ;\fake Rules of Appellate
,

Procedure, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1303 (1936). The memorandum, dated February 2, 1936, can

be found in 2 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCE
DURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Harvard Law School Library). See
also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1138 n.545.
16. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (Oct. 15, 1938) (extract with
letter from Charles E. Clark to Monte M. Lemann (Nov. I, 1938) (Chailes E. Clark Papers
Yale University Library, box 113, folder 65)).

,

17.

See supra note II.

18.

447 U. S. 752 (1980).
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possible sources of authority for the district court's order that coun
sel for the plaintiffs pay more than $17,000 in costs and attorney's
fees to the defendant.28 U.
S.
C.§ 192719 was found not to authorize
an award of attorney's fees. 20 The Court upheld the "inherent
power " of a trial court to award attorney's fees in certain circum
stances but defined those circumstances as necessarily including con
duct that constitutes or is tantamount to bad faith, as to which there
was no specific finding. 12 Finally, the Court invited the district court
on remand to consider whether to award costs and attorney's fees for
failure to answer Roadway

Express' interrogatories under Rule

37(b)
.22
Now, since the Court's decision in Roadway Express, 28 U.
S.C.
§ 1927 has been amended to include the sanction of attorney's fees. 23
The statutory amendment should not, however, provide comfort
to-indeed, it should discomfort-the rulemakers. The proposed
amendment to Rule 26 (as with proposed Rule 11) provides sanc
tions that may include a reasonable attorney's fee without requiring
conduct that was willful, in bad faith, or the like. 24 In amending
section 1927, on the other hand, Congress specifically declined to
alter the standard under existing law, described by Representative
Mazzoli as requiring "the attorney conduct, if sanctionable, to be
solely for the purpose of delay . . . ."n As he explained: "The man
agers on the part of the House were firm in their resolve to maintain
the tough standard of current law so that the legislation in no way
would dampen the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his
client." 26 Representative McClory observed that the House conferees

19. "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such
excess costs." 28 U. S.C. § 1927 (1976). The statute has since been amended. See infra text
accompanying note 23.
20. 44·1 U. S. at 757·63.
21. !d. at 764·67.
22. !d. at 764.
23. The current version reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 ( Supp. Y 1982).
24. See supra notes 9, II.
25. 126 CONG. REC. H8047 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980).
26. !d.

1004
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were una ble to accept the Senate standard (which required a finding
that the attorney "intentionally engage[d] in conduct unreasonably
and primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing the cost of
the litigation ")27 because it "would have lowered the standard of dil
atory conduct necessary to make out a violation and would have
done so to such an extent that . .. the legitimate zeal of attorneys
representing their clients would have been chilled.
"28 In other words,
the amendment to section 1927 changed the extent of liability of an
attorney found in violation. Query, however, whether in light of the
policy judgments made by Congress, that is all it did,29 a question to
which I shall return. In any event, the amended statute by itself
hardly provides authority for the expansive approach to sanctions
taken in the proposed amendments.
What of the "court's inherent power "? Here, we immediately
encounter a problem of definition that has eluded or bedeviled many
courts and commentators for years.30 The Advisory Committee may

27. S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979), 125 CoNG. REC. 19,916 (1979).See also
S. REP. No. 238, 96th Cong., l st Sess. 2-3, 9- l 0 (1979).
28. 126 CoNG. REc. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980).See also H.R. REP. No. 1234,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Conference Repart), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2781, 2782 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
29. [W]e chose not to alter the standard of conduct required by present law. What
we did change was the extent of liability to be imposed on attorneys who engage in
clearly dilatory tactics. . . . The extent of this liability cannot, in justice, be limited
merely to filing fees and other nominal court costs as it is today. But it should
extend to out-of-pocket costs that the opposition had to incur for legal fees and
witness expenses because of the attorney's misconduct.This is what our compromise
does-this is all it does, and I believe that it should be accepted by this body.
I 26 CO N G . REc. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, I 980) (statement of Rep. McClory).
30. For assistance in penetrating the rhetoric of inherent judicial power, see Frankfurter
& Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal
Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Levin & Amster
dam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem of Constitutional Revision,
107 U. PA. L. REv. l, 29-33 (1958); Williams, The Source of Authority for R u les of Court
Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q . 459 (1937). See also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1021
n.l 9. 1115 n.455. 1183 n.728.
Apart from failing to distinguish between judicial power to act in th e absence of contrary
legislative direction and power to act notwithstanding such direction, the problem discussed in
the text, commentators are too quick to find assertions of inherent power in judicial opinions.
Take, for instance, Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) I 23 (1865) (The date of decision and
the proper case caption can be found in 17 Law. Ed. 759. The error in the official report was
confirmed by the Court's Reporter of Decisions on March 25, 1983.), where the Court stated:
"Circuit courts, as well as all other federal courts, have authority to make and establish all
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are
not repugnant to the laws of the United States." !d. at 128 (emphasis added). The case is
cited for the proposition that the federal courts possess inherent power to make rules. See, e.g.,
R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOO:-JEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE fED-
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be no exception, if the serial citation of

Roadway Express and Half
v. Co/e31 in the Note to proposed Rule 11 was intended to suggest
that these cases stand for the same proposition. 32In Hall, the Court
was discussing an equitable doctrine that, as the opinion itself
pointed out, is within the power of Congress to reverse. 33In

Road
way Express, on the other hand, the Court was discussing a power

that is inherent in the sense that it trumps a contrary determination
by Congress. It is for that reason that the Court observed: "Because
inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they
must be exercised with restraint and discretion. "34 Indeed, appar
ently preoccupied with the specific context (attorney's fees), the
Court opined that "a specific finding as to whether counsel's conduct
.. . constituted or was tantamount to bad faith . . . would have to
precede

any sanction under the court's inherent powers. "311

It may not be fair to tax the Advisory Committee with perpetu
ating confusion about the concept of inherent power, both because its
citation to

Hall occurs in the Note to proposed Rule 1 1 and the

specific reference to "the court's inherent power " occurs in the Note
to proposed Rule 26, and because the Court itself was confused in

Roadway Express, relying on cases such as Hall and Alyeska Pipe
line Service v. Wilderness Society,36 cases involving judicial power
indisputably subject to congressional override, 37 for the content of a
judicial power "shielded from direct democratic controls. " Again,
however, the inherent power concept, at least as blessed by the Su-

ERAL RULES OF CiVIL PROCEDURE 181 n.473 (1981); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 374, 396 n.80 ( 1982); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abwe
the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619, 633 (1977). Of course. even if the Court had
been asserting inherent power, it was power subject to congressional override. But the Court
was not asserting any inherent power at all. Rather, it was, in the italicized language, directly
quoting the Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, I Stat. 73, 83. See also Burbank, supra note 2,
at 1115 n. 455.
412 U. S. I (1973).
See supra text accompanying note 12.
33. "This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where 'fee-shifting' would be ap
propriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief. " 412 U.S.
at 9.
34. 447 U. S. at 764.
35. !d. at 767 (emphasis added). Although this dictum may be defensible, its origins, see
infra text accompanying notes 36-37, provide grounds for skepticism. One might have hoped
for greater "restraint and discretion" in the articulation of the doctrine of inherent power.
31.
32.

36. 421 u.s. 240 (1975).
37. See supra text accompanying note 33; see also 421 U. S. at 259 ("These exceptions
are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress .
.").
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Roadway Express, hardly supports, by itself, the

breadth of the sanction provisions in these proposed amendments.
We are remitted then to the Advisory Committee's reliance on
Rule

37 and can now better understand its citation, in the Note to
26, of a student piece in the University of Chicago
Law Review, where the author concludes: "[T]he great advantage of

proposed Rule

sanctions entered pursuant to the courts' rulemaking power is that
negligent or reckless conduct can clearly be sufficient for liability."38
There is no question that provisions of Rule

37 in its present form

authorize the imposition of sanctions, including attorney's fees, for
conduct that does not rise to the level of bad faith and that is not as
egregious as conduct triggering

28 U .S.C. § 1927.39 The inquiry then

is whether such provisions are a

':'.�159 �-exercise

of the rulemaking

power, an inquiry that requires us to consider the Rules Enabling
Act of

1934.40

For purposes of simplicity, it may be useful to phrase two ques
tions:

(1) Does the Supreme Court have the power under the Rules

Enabling Act to promulgate rules that authorize the imposition of
sanctions, including reasonable attorney's fees, on parties or their at
torneys for conduct that is negligent (or, if you like, non-willful, not
in bad faith, or whatever similar formulation is necessary to remove
the proposed amendments from any protective umbrella of section

1927 and inherent power as defined in Roadway Express)? (2) Does
the Supreme Court have the power under the Act to promulgate
rules that

require the imposition of sanctions in those circumstances ?

I believe the answer to the first question is affirmative, although that
answer is not reached without difficulty. An affirmative answer to the
second question requires the surmounting of even greater difficulties.
As long as

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.41 remains law and the

Court that promulgates Federal Rules and amendments has the final
word on their validity,42disputations regarding validity and invalid38. N01e, supra note 30, at 636. For the Committee's citation, see supra text accompa
nying note 13. The Note otherwise contains a number of impediments to citation, including the
attribution to Congress of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
at 632 ("Congress not only added these two provisions .... "). See also supra note 30.
39. See FED. R. C!v. P. 37(a)(4), (b), (c) & (d). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 30(g). But
see FED. R. C!v. P. 37(g) (requiring failure "to participate in good faith").
40. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
41. 312 U. S. I (1941). Sibbach has not been repudiated. See Burbank, supra note 2, at
1023.
42. See W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 75-78; see also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1129
n.515, 1134 n.530, 1137. There are suggestions that the Chief Justice, at least, is disposed to
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ity are likely to be of purely academic interest, and the remedy, if
any, to overreaching will come by way of congressional action. As
one who has recently penned many pages of academic disputation on
the subject,43 I will hardly shirk an opportunity for a brief refrain
particularly because, for reasons not unrelated to those germane in a
doctrinal analysis, there is some basis for prediction that Congress,
given its willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed Federal Rules
and amendments,44 will show an interest in these.
Historical research suggests that

Congress' purpose in the

famous first two sentences of the 1934 Act4
� was to allocate lawmak
ing power between federal institutions, the Supreme Court (as
rulemaker) and Congress, and that the protection of state law was
deemed a likely effect, rather than the primary purpose, of the pro
cedure/substance dichotomy. 46 Moreover, the history tells us that
Congress intended significantly greater limitations on rulemaking
than the Court has acknowledged-either implicitly in promulgating
Federal Rules and amendments or explicitly in cases adjudicating
their

validity.

Briefly,

Congress'

concerns

seem

to

have

been

rulemaking in areas where choices would have a predictable and
identifiable impact on rights claimed under the substantive law or on
interests claimed under the Constitution, and rulemaking in areas
where choices would

create rights substantially similar to rights

under the substantive law in their effect on persons or property.47
Of course, a sanction-the sanction of arrest for contempt in
failing to obey an order to submit to a physical examination-was
central to the Court's decision, although not to the parties' argu
ments, in the

Sibbach case.48 Moreover, in the pre-1934 legislative

materials that inform the interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act,
there is evidence of particular concern about arrest, probably be-

disengage the Court from rule promulgation. See id. at ! 021 n.l6, 1195-96. The principles
approved by the ADA's House of Dckgatcs in 1982 call for transfer of the Court's functions to
the Judicial Conference. See supra note 2.
43. Burbank, supra note 2.
44. See id. at 1018-20.
45. "[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by
general rules . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the
substantive rights of any litigant." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § l, 48 Stat.
1064, 1064. For the subsequent history of the Act, see Burbank, supra note 2, at 1101-04.
46. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1106-12.
47. See id. at 1121-31.
48. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. I, 14, 16 (1941); Burbank, supra note 2, at 118184.
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cause of its equivalence in the bill's sponsors' minds with a rule of
_
substantive law.49 In any event, the Court's convoluted reasonmg
about Rule 37 in Sibbach aside, �0 that rule is valid even with respect
to the sanction of arrest for contempt precisely because it makes no
choices.�1
We need not be concerned about the sanction of arrest (for con
tempt)in connection with the proposed amendments to Rules 11 and
26, because the trial judge retains discretion to choose from a range
of available sanctions.62What then is the problem? As I see it, the
problem is this: In the legislative history of the amendments to 28
U .S.C.

§ 1927, Congress itself identified as a concern the effect of

alternative choices among standards for imposing sanctions on the
"legitimate zeal " of attorneys in representing their clients.113In other
words, it was not the sanction to be imposed-Congress agreed that
the range of sanctions should be augmented-but the conduct trig
gering the imposition that was of concern. Moreover, Congress ap
parently believed that judgments about the effect of alternative sanc
tioning standards on lawyers' conduct (and, implicitly, on their
clients' cases)could be made with some confidence.
Even with the gloss provided by this legislative history, I do not
maintain that the proposed amendments are invalid under the stan
dards emerging from the Rules Enabling Act's pre-1934 history. For
accepting, as I do not, Congress' judgment about the predictability
of impact of choices among different sanctioning standards, that im
pact is not identifiable in any particular class of cases.64 The
rulemakers have not, however, aided their case by supplementing one
rulemaking choice with another, that is, by making the imposition of
sanctions mandatory upon a finding of violation.
The proposed amendments to Rules 11 and 26 differ from the

49. See Burbank, supra note 2, at I 121-22, I 124, I128.
50. See id. at I 181-82.
51. See id. at I I84. More generally, "[t]o the extent that a Fed .:raJ Rule makes no
choices or makes a choice the consequences of which are defeasible by operation of another
Federal Rule, the argument for invalidity under [the standards derived from the Act's pre1934 history] appears to be weakened considerably." Jd. at I 193 (footnote omitted).
Of course, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) does not permit the trial court to treat failure to obey an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination as a contempt of court. The counterpart
involved in Sibbach, see 312 U. S. at 9, authorized, excepl in such cases, "an order directing
the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders
." See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1181 n.718.
52. See supra notes 9, I I.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
54. Cf Burbank, supra note 2, at I 129-30 (evidence), 1183 (discovery).
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provisions of Rule

37 in at least one significant respect: The proposed
require the court to impose sanctions upon violation of
the respective certification requirements, whereas Rule 37 affords
amendments

discretion, even though at first blush there does not appear to be
any. � � In this aspect, the proposed amendments do not, and do not
purport to, find any support in Rule

37 or in the other sources of
(1) An inflexible requirement to impose sanc

authority relied on:

tions is the antithesis of the equitable doctrine referred to in the Ad
visory Committee Note to proposed Rule

11. "The essence of the

equity jurisdiction," the Court has reminded us, "has been the power
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the ne
cessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it." �6

(2) A rule affording no discretion cannot, I be

lieve, be justified as an exercise of "inherent power" of the sort to
which the Court was referring in

Roadway Express. Such a rule

hardly bespeaks the "restraint and discretion" to which the Court in
that case referred. �7

(3) Finally, in this aspect, section 1927 clearly

contemplates the exercise of discretion by the trial judgc.�8
The Advisory Committee's ambivalence on this score is obvious
in the Notes, which, in speaking of "explicitly encouraging the impo
sition of sanctions,"�9 seem to me to toll the thirteenth hour.And,
again, I recognize that discretion is preserved as to the sanction that
will be imposed (as well as, inevitably, in the application of the stan
dard to any given set of facts). But a lawyer concerned about adher
ing to the Code of Professional Responsibility and to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to assume that, after so much
effort, the rulemakers have created a paper tiger. Moreover, my ho
pothetical lawyer cannot take much comfort from the picture of due
process in sanctioning painted by the Advisory Committee,60 which,

55. Thus, putatively mandatory language in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b) & (d) is
qualified by the identical clause, "unless the court finds that the [relevant behavior] was sub
stantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. " See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Imposition of sanctions under FED. R. C!v. P. 37(g) is explicitly discre
tionary ("the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require . . . . ) . But see FED. R. CJv.
P. 56(g).
56. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
57. Supra text accompanying note 34.
58. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
59. Proposed FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT,
supra note l , at 58.
60. See proposed FED. R. C!v. P. II advisory committee note:
"

The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particu
lar format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation and
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although consistent with the austere landscape of Link v. Wabash
Railroad,61 does not seem of one p iece with the Court's more recent
expression on the subject in R oa dway Express,62 or with Congress'
purpose in amending section 1927. We have apparently returned to
the view that " [t] o say that a law does not violate the due process
"6 3That is hardly
clause, is to say the least possible good about it.
the view the House and Senate managers took when, as reported by
one of them, they
strongly agreed that judges who utilize section 1 927 sanctions must
make every effort to safeguard the rights of an attorney who may
be held in violation of that section. In so doing, it is imperative that
the court afford the attorney all appropriate protections of due
process available under the law.64

We are not, in any event, confined to the evidence of history in
interpreting the Rules Enabling Act. The standards of rulemaking

the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many si tuations the judge's par
ticipation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the relevan t facts
and little further inquiry will be necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the
pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposi
tion of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction
proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the
court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
S U P R E M E COURT R E PORT, supra note ! , at 4 1 . See also proposed FED. R. Ci v . P. 26(g) advi
sory committee note:
The sanctioning process must comport with due process requirements. The kind
of notice and hearing required will depend on the facts of the case and the severity
of the sanction being considered. To prevent the proliferaton of the sanction proce
dure and to avoid multiple hearings, discovery in any sanction proceeding normally
should be permitted only when it is clearly required by the interests of justice. I n
most cases the court will b e aware o f the circumstances and only a brief hearing
should be necessary.
S U P R E M E COURT R E PORT, supra note I , at 60. Thus does fairness yield to the demands, as
well as the jargon, of efficiency, convincing even one who is skeptical about the accuracy of the
picture drawn by Resnik, supra note 30, that the author has a point. This is "ma nagerial
judging" with a vengeance. Note, moreover, that as recently as ! 980, the rulcmakers saw fit to
provide in the text of FED. R. CJv. P. 37(g) that a sanction might be imposed "after opportu
nity for hearing."
6 1 . 370 U. S. 626, 632 ( 1 962).
62. "Like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or
without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record." 447 U .S . at 767 (footnote
omitted ).
63. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 2 5 A R K . L.
R E V . 9, 25 ( 1 97 1 ) .
64. 1 26 C O N G . R Ec. H8047 (daily ed . Aug. 28, 1 980) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). See
a/so C O I' F E R E N C E R E P O R T , supra note 28, at 8.
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allocation suggested by the pre- 1934 history were formulated for an
other age and may not be adequate for the needs of the nation to
day.65 Whereas much of the debate about these sanctioning provi
sions has concerned-and the Advisory Committee appears to have
painted a picture of due process with an eye to--the possible effect
of "satellite litigation " on judicial administration,66 a procedural
concern, the concern identified by Congress in the legislative history
of the amendment of section 1 927 is much more difficult to charac
terize. Consider the brouhaha about the privilege provisions in the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.6 7
The Rules Enabling Act allocates lawmaking power. Where our
elected representatives have concluded that choices among standards
for imposing sanctions on attorneys implicate the effectiveness of
representation of clients, it seems to me a fair question whether
those choices should be made by the rulemakers or by Congress.68
The question is more insistent when the trial judge's discretion is,
even if only formally, constrained. It should be obvious that I do not
regard the "laying before " provision of the Rules Enabling Act69 as
a substitute for, or as equivalent to, congressional action.7 0 In light
of Congress' unhappiness with that mechanism in recent years, 71 and
of the concerns expressed in connection with section 1 927, the point
may again become a moot one. If so, the blame lies with all of us for
continuing to fail to confront "the admittedly difficult business of
defining institutional limits in a federal democracy. " 72

65. See Burbank. supra note 2, at 1 1 04·06, 1 1 86-97.
66. See supra note 60.
67. See, e.g., S. R E P . N o . 1 277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 ( 1 974); 1 20 CO NG REC. 1 42021 ( 1 974) (statement of Rep. Holtzman); id. at 239 i -92.
68. Compare proposed FED. R . Ctv. P. 1 1 advisory committee note, S u P R E M E CoURT
R E PO RT, supra note 1, at 39 ("The rule is not intended to chill a n attorney's enthusiasm or
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.") with s upra text accompanying notes 25-28.
The point, of course, is not that Congress' conclusion abcut the effect of sanctions on the
"legitimate zeal" of attorneys is correct or, indeed, that against the background of the pro
posed amendments, the concern should dominate in the lawmaking calculus. It is rather that
articulated public policy should not be ignored by the rulemakers.
69. "Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the
C hief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first
day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28
U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1 976).
70. See Burbank, s upra note 2, at II 02, 1 1 96.
7 1 . See id. at 1 0 1 8-20, 1 1 96 n.779.
72. /d. at 1 1 97.
.

